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ABSTRACT
HETEROGENEITY IN INFLATION PERSISTENCE
AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY
KÖSEM ALP, Sevim
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Refet Gürkaynak
January 2009
Inﬂation persistence diﬀers substantially across sectors. This paper analyzes
the relevance of sectoral inﬂation persistence diﬀerentials for optimal mone-
tary policy using a two-sector sticky price model, which generalizes the models
existing in the literature by introducing inﬂation persistence to both sectors.
Heterogeneity in inﬂation persistence results from introduction of diﬀerent
price setting mechanisms across sectors. The literature suggests that in purely
forward looking models, when the degree of nominal rigidity is uniform across
sectors, it is optimal to target the CPI inﬂation. In this paper, the degree
of nominal rigidity, which is computed according to the approximate mea-
sure proposed by Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2006), is uniform across sectors
but the same rigidity is produced by diﬀerent combinations of price change
frequency and backward looking behavior. Based on a second order approx-
imation to the utility function, ﬁrst the fully optimal monetary policy is
computed. Then, using the fully optimal policy as a benchmark, the perfor-
mance of the CPI inﬂation targeting rule proposed by Benigno and Lopez-
Salido and the optimal inﬂation targeting policy are compared under diﬀerent
parameter combinations culminating to the same degree of nominal rigidity
but generating diﬀerent degrees of inﬂation persistence across sectors. Wel-
fare analysis shows that adopting CPI inﬂation targeting instead of optimal
inﬂation targeting implies a signiﬁcant increase in deadweight loss. This loss
is highest when one of the sectors has inﬂation persistence close to zero.
Keywords: Relative prices; Optimal monetary policy; Welfare analysis; Inﬂa-
tion Persistence
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ÖZET
ENFLASYON ATALETNDEK HETEROJENLK
VE OPTMAL PARA POLTKASI
KÖSEM ALP, Sevim
Yüksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr.Refet Gürkaynak
Ocak 2009
Sektörel enﬂasyon ataletleri birbirinden epey farkldr. Bu makalede, sek-
törel enﬂasyon ataleti farkll§nn optimal para politikas ile ili³kisi, ﬁyat
katl§na sahip iki sektörden olu³an ve her iki sektöre de geriye dönük ﬁyat-
lama davran³n getirerek literatürdeki modelleri genelleyen bir model kul-
lanlarak analiz edilmektedir. Sektörel enﬂasyon ataleti farkll§, sektörlerin
farkl ﬁyatlama davran³lar göstermelerinden kaynaklanmaktadr. Literatür,
sektörlerin sadece ileriye dönük ﬁyatlama yapt§ ve birbirine e³it nominal
katl§a sahip oldu§u modellerde, optimal enﬂasyon hedeﬂemesi kural olarak
tüketici enﬂasyonunun hedeﬂenmesini önermektedir. Bu makalede, sektörler
Benigno ve Lopez-Salido (2006) tarafndan önerilen bir nominal ﬁyat katl§
ölçütüne göre ayn nominal katl§a sahip olacak; ancak bu katlk farkl ﬁyat
de§i³tirme olaslklar ve geriye dönük ﬁyatlama davran³ oran kombinasyon-
larnca üretilecek ³ekilde modellenmi³tir. lk olarak, fayda fonksiyonuna ikinci
derece yakla³m kullanlarak optimal para politikas hesaplanm³tr. Optimal
para politikas gösterge olarak kullanlarak, Benigno ve Lopez-Salido ölçütüne
göre ayn ﬁyat katl§ ve farkl enﬂasyon ataleti üreten de§i³ik parametre
kombinasyonlar altnda, optimal enﬂasyon hedeﬂemesi ve tüketici enﬂasyonu
hedeﬂemesi kurallarnn performanslar kar³la³trlm³tr. Refah analizi, op-
timal enﬂasyon kural yerine tüketici enﬂasyonunun hedeﬂenmesinin önemli
bir refah kaybna sebep oldu§unu göstermektedir. En yüksek refah kayb sek-
törlerden birinin sfra yakn enﬂasyon ataleti sergiledi§i durumlarda gerçek-
le³mektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Göreli ﬁyatlar; Optimal para politikas; Refah analizi;
Enﬂasyon ataleti
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Many macroeconomic studies show that the degree of persistence diﬀers sub-
stantially across sectors.1 The heterogeneity in inﬂation persistence arises
from diﬀerent price setting mechanisms in diﬀerent sectors. The existence
of this type of heterogeneity across sectors has implications for monetary
policy for two main reasons. First, understanding sectoral responses to mon-
etary policy shocks can be helpful in explaining the mechanism through which
monetary policy aﬀects the real economy.2 Second, the heterogeneity across
sectors determines the way monetary policy should be designed.
The relevance of the heterogeneity in price setting mechanism for the design
of optimal monetary policy was studied before by assuming diﬀerent price
change frequencies, 1− α, for diﬀerent sectors. Aoki (2001) employs a model
with one ﬂexible and one sticky price sector and shows that optimal policy is
to stabilize the inﬂation of the sticky price sector. Benigno (2004) introduces
sluggish price adjustment àla Calvo into both regions of a currency union and
argues that optimal inﬂation targeting policy is to pay higher attention to the
inﬂation of the sector that is constraint by lower frequency of price change.3
1See, among many others, Leith and Malley (2005), Aucramanne and Collin (2005),
Altissimo, Mojon and Zaﬀaroni(2007), Bilke(2004), Lünnemann and Mathä (2004).
2See Carvalho (2005).
3Note that the analysis of the optimal monetary policy under a currency union with
heterogeneous regions and in a single country with heterogeneous sectors is analogous. The
only diﬀerence is that what is called terms of trade in the two region model corresponds
1
Note that the models mentioned above share the following common char-
acteristics. First, the degree of nominal rigidity for each sector, which is
measured by average duration of prices being ﬁxed, is given by the expression
NR = 1/(1 − α). Therefore, the degree of nominal rigidity increases as α
increases. Second, the only determinant of the degree of inﬂation persistence,
which is the rate that inﬂation converges back to the steady state, is α. The
higher α, the slower the adjustment of the aggregate price level and the more
persistent the inﬂation. Third, as far as the optimal policy design is con-
cerned, they argue that the optimal inﬂation targeting policy is to target the
inﬂation of the sector that has higher α, at the same time, has higher de-
gree of nominal rigidity and inﬂation persistence. Therefore, in these models
inability to change the price governs all dynamics of the inﬂation and is a
summary statistic to design the optimal policy.
Last, these models imply purely forward looking New Keynesian Philips
curves (NKPC), in which inﬂation of the previous period is not part of price
setting mechanism, and produce front-loaded impulse responses. These stud-
ies imply purely forward looking Philips curves and front loaded impulse
responses. Thus, they do not incorporate the persistence of sectoral inﬂa-
tions observed in the data. An exception to this is Benigno and Lopez-Salido
(2006) [BL-S] who develop a two-region sticky-price model of a currency union
with a single region displaying inﬂation persistence. That is, only one of the
sectors has NKPC with lagged inﬂation and inﬂation of that sector display
hump shaped impulse responses, which is consistent with the results of the
empirical studies. The persistence in that region is modeled by introducing a
type of producers who set their prices according to a rule-of-thumb consistent
with similar single sector model of Gali and Gertler (1999). BL-S proposes
to a relative price in the two sector model.
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an approximate nominal rigidity measure for the hybrid price setting sec-
tor, which is explained in detail in section 3. BL-S suggests that when this
measure implies the same degree of nominal rigidity across sectors, optimal
inﬂation targeting policy is targeting the CPI inﬂation.
Having estimated the structural parameters for the euro area, BL-S concludes
that it is optimal to target the inﬂation of the region that has higher degree
of nominal rigidity and has inﬂation persistence. Here the measure for degree
of inﬂation persistence is the coeﬃcient of the lagged inﬂation in the NKPC. 4
In this paper, I build on the insights of this approach, but extend the analy-
sis to take account of sectoral diﬀerences in inﬂation persistence by assuming
backward looking price setters for both sectors. Although evidence suggests
that all sectors are characterized by hybrid price setting with diﬀerent mech-
anisms, currently there exists no study allowing for inﬂation persistence for
both sectors.5 Thus, one of the goals of this paper is to ﬁll this hole in the
literature.
In this paper, the degree of nominal rigidity calculated using the measure
proposed by BL-S, is uniform across sectors but the same rigidity is produced
by diﬀerent price setting mechanisms in diﬀerent sectors. The sectors are
assumed to be of equal economic size.6 First, the optimal inﬂation target-
ing rule is calculated for diﬀerent calibrations of the structural parameters
of the price setting. The ﬁrst main ﬁnding of this paper is that in contrast
to proposition of BL-S, CPI inﬂation targeting is not the optimal inﬂation
4Note that the persistence in the forward looking region is zero. Thus, result of BL-S
can be interpreted as targeting the inﬂation of the sector that has higher degree of inﬂation
persistence as done by Levin and Moessner (2005).
5Leith and Malley (2005) shows that all sectors in US manufacturing industry display
hybrid price setting mechanism, which is heterogeneous across sectors.
6Alternative calibrations of the economic sizes are possible and do not change the results
of the paper.
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targeting rule, even if the degree of nominal rigidity proposed by BL-S is the
same across sectors. Moreover, the policy of targeting the inﬂation of the
sector with higher degree of inﬂation persistence is not robust to diﬀerent
parameter calibrations.
The second main concern of this paper is the welfare cost of using the nominal
rigidity measure proposed by BL-S as a summary statistic for inﬂation tar-
geting policy design. The fully optimal policy is computed to conduct welfare
analysis. The welfare measure is the percentage reduction in deadweight loss
that can be realized by employing the optimal inﬂation targeting rule instead
of CPI inﬂation targeting. Welfare analysis suggests that adopting the op-
timal inﬂation targeting rule instead of the CPI inﬂation targeting increases
welfare by about 6% of the optimal welfare for standard calibrations. Thus,
BL-S measure is not a suﬃcient summary statistic in a general model since
the policy of targeting the CPI inﬂation, which is based on the equivalence
of the rigidity across sectors using this measure, does not approximate the
welfare obtained by adopting the optimal inﬂation targeting regime. Another
ﬁnding is that the percentage reduction in welfare loss is highest when one of
the sectors has inﬂation persistence that is close to zero.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and the utility based welfare function that policymakers seek to maximize.
The emphasis will be on how the existence of backward looking price-setters
aﬀects this welfare function. Section 3 shows the optimal inﬂation targeting
rule and the welfare comparison of adopting the optimal inﬂation targeting
regime versus the CPI inﬂation targeting regime, in the case that the degree
of nominal rigidity proposed by BL-S is uniform but inﬂation persistence is
heterogeneous across sectors. Section 4 concludes.
4
CHAPTER 2
THE MODEL
The model studied in this paper is a stochastic general equilibrium represen-
tative household model with two monopolistically competitive sectors. Both
sectors are characterized by sluggish price adjustment and a fraction of pro-
ducers in each sector are unsophisticated price setters, who adjust their prices
to according to a rule of thumb. In this paper, I generalize the standard two
sector models in the literature by introducing backward indexing producers
into both sectors. 1
2.1 Utility of a Representative Household
Each household consumes all of the diﬀerentiated goods in both sectors, and
produces a single good. The objective of household j is to maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u(ξdtC
j
t )− v(ξsi,tyji,t)
]
(2.1)
where u(·) represents the utility of consumption and v(·) represents the disu-
tility of production. I make the usual assumptions that u(·) is increasing and
concave, and that v(·) is increasing and convex. The constant β∈(0,1) is the
discount factor and the argument Cjt , which represents a CES index of repre-
sentative household purchases of the diﬀerentiated goods of both sectors, is
1The model simulation procedure is implemented using the free-available and open
source DYNARE software.
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deﬁned as
Cjt =
1
2
(
Cj1,t
)1/2 (
Cj2,t
)1/2
(2.2)
where Cjt itself is a CES aggregate of sectoral goods
Cji,t =
[∫ 1
0
cji,t(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
(2.3)
Here i ∈ {1, 2}indexes sectors. The elasticity of substitution between any two
diﬀerentiated goods in each sector, θ, is assumed to be greater than unity
and uniform across sectors. The argument yji,t is the output of the good that
representative household j in sector i produces. The household indexed by j
produces one of the diﬀerentiated goods in sector i. Following Aoki (2001), I
assume that the preference shock ξdt is identical across all households. I also
assume that ξsi,t= ξ
s
1,t for all households producing one of the diﬀerentiated
goods of the ﬁrst sector and ξsi,t= ξ
s
2,t for all households producing one of
the diﬀerentiated goods of the second sector, where ξdt and ξ
s
i,t are stationary
random shocks. These assumptions imply that all of the households in the
same sector face the same supply shocks and that there is no sector speciﬁc
demand shock in this economy.
2.2 The Consumption Decision
The model assumes complete ﬁnancial markets with no obstacles to borrow-
ing against future income, so that each household faces a single intertemporal
budget constraint. The model further assumes that households can insure one
another against idiosyncratic income risk. These assumptions imply that, if
all households have identical initial wealth, they will choose identical con-
sumption plans. The optimal allocation for a given level of nominal spending
across all of the diﬀerentiated goods of both sectors at time t leads to the
6
Dixit-Stiglitz demand relations as functions of relative prices. For the fol-
lowing, the index j is suppressed, since the consumption decision is identical
across all households. The total expenditure required to obtain a given level
of consumption index Ct is given by PtCt, where Pt is deﬁned as
Pt = (P1,t)
1/2(P2,t)
1/2 (2.4)
Here Pi,t is the price index of the sector i deﬁned below. Demand for the
sectoral composite diﬀerentiated goods of sector i are the usual Dixit-Stiglitz
demand relations as functions of relative prices, which are given by
Ci,t =
1
2
(
Pi,t
PT
)−1
Ct (2.5)
where Pi,t is the Dixit-Stiglitz price index deﬁned as
Pi,t =
[∫ 1
0
pi,t(z)
1−θdz
] 1
1−θ
(2.6)
where pi,t(z) is the price of diﬀerentiated good in sector i indexed as z at time
t.
Demand for each diﬀerentiated good z, ci,t(z), is given by
ci,t(z) =
1
2
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−1(
pi,t(z)
Pi,t
)−θ
Ct (2.7)
The optimal consumption plan of the household must satisfy
ξdt u
′(ξdtCt)
Pt
= Λt (2.8)
where Λt is marginal utility of nominal income, which follows the rule of
motion
Λt(1 + Rt) = βΛt+1 (2.9)
where Rt is the risk-free nominal interest rate at time t.
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2.3 The Production Decision
It is assumed, as is standard in this literature, that prices in both sticky-price
sectors are changed at exogenous random intervals in the fashion of Calvo
(1983). The producers in each sector can change their prices with a constant
probability 1− α. A fraction 1− ψi of the households who can change their
prices behave optimally when making their pricing decisions. I refer to these
households as the forward-looking households. The remaining households, a
fraction ψi, instead use a simple backward-looking rule-of-thumb when setting
their prices. I refer to these households as the backward-looking households.
Given the complete markets and symmetric initial steady state assumptions,
all forward-looking households that are able to adjust their price at date t
, will choose the same price. Let pfi,t denote this price. I assume that all
backward-looking households who change their price at date T also set the
same price. Let pbi,t denote this price.
The forward looking producer who is able to choose his price in period t
chooses pfi,t to maximize the discounted future proﬁts
Et
{ ∞∑
k=0
{
(αiβ)
k[Λt+kpi,tyi,t+k − v(ξst+kyi,t+k
}}
(2.10)
First term is the expected revenue in utility terms. Since the cost of produc-
tion is in terms of utility, the revenue is multiplied by the marginal utility
of income. Maximizing the objective function with respect to pfi,t gives the
following ﬁrst order condition:
Et
{ ∞∑
k=0
{
(αiβ)
kΩi,t+k(p
f
i,t −
θ
θ − 1Si,t+k
}}
= 0 (2.11)
where
8
Ωi,t+k ≡
ξdt+ku
′(ξdt+kCt+k)
ξdt u
′(ξdtCt)
ci,t+k(z) (2.12)
and
Si,t+k =
ξsi,t+kv
′(ξsi,t+kyi,t+k)
ξdt+ku
′(ξdt+kCt+k)
Pi,t+k (2.13)
is interpreted as the nominal marginal cost of sector i. Since the household
is both worker and the owner of the ﬁrm in sector i, the cost of production is
the disutility resulting from working.
As in Gali and Gertler (1999), I assume that the backward-looking ﬁrms set
their prices according to the following rule:
pbi,t = p
∗
i,t−1pii,t−1 (2.14)
where pii,t−1=pi,t−1/pi,t−2 and p
∗
i,t−1is an index of prices set at t-1,given by
p∗i,t−1 = (p
f
i,t−1)
1−ψi(pbi,t−1)
ψi (2.15)
According to equation (2.15) the backward looking ﬁrms adjust their prices to
equal the geometric mean of the prices that they saw chosen in the previous
period, p∗i,t−1, adjusted for the sectoral inﬂation rate they last observed in the
previous period, pii,t−1. That is, these ﬁrms use the inﬂation observed in the
previous period a proxy for that of the current period. This way of price set-
ting, while not optimal, keeps their relative prices same across periods when
inﬂation is constant, for example at steady state.
The aggregate price level will then evolve according to
pi,t =
(
αip
1−θ
i,t−1 + (1− αi)(1− ψi)(pfi,t)1−θ + (1− αi)ψi(pbi,t)1−θ
) 1
1−θ
(2.16)
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Each period, a fraction αi of the producers keeps charging the price of the
previous period. The remaining 1 − αi of the ﬁrms change their prices but
only 1−ψi of them choose the optimal price and the remaining producers set
their prices according to the rule of thumb.
Unsophisticated price setters are introduced into both sectors because stan-
dard New Keynesian models with purely forward looking price setting mech-
anisms fail to explain the hump shaped responses of sectoral inﬂations to
demand and supply shocks. Introducing this type of backward looking be-
havior helps alleviate this problem.
2.4 Log-linearization of the Model
In this paper, the equations of the model, which is a general form of the
model used by BL-S, are a quite complicated system of stochastic non-linear
diﬀerence equations. I log-linearize the model around its steady state with
zero inﬂation and study the dynamics of this approximate model.
The relative price charged at time t by ﬁrms with new prices of diﬀeren-
tiated goods in sector i is denoted by xki,t = p
k
i,t/Pi,t, k=f for price set by
forward looking behavior and k=b for price set according to rule of thumb.
xi,t = Pi,t/Pt denotes the relative price of each sector.
The aggregate demand equation is the log-linearized Euler conditions (2.9)
and (2.11), imply the following IS curve 2
yˆt = Etyˆt+1 − σ(rt − Etpˆit+1 − ξˆdt + Etξˆdt+1) (2.17)
2Variables with hats denote the percentage deviations from the steady state.
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The NKPC of the sector i is given by
pˆii,t = κi1(yˆt − yˆni,t) + κi2pˆii,t−1 + κi3pˆii,t+1 + κi4xˆi,t (2.18)
where
κi1 =
(1− αiβ)(ω−1 + σ−1)(1− αi)(1− ψi)
(1 + θ
ω
)(αi + ψi(1− αi + αiβ))
κi2 =
ψi
αi + ψi(1− αi + αiβ)
κi3 =
αiβ
αi + ψi(1− αi + αiβ)
κi4 = −(1− αiβ)(1 + ω)(1− ψi)(1− αi)
(ω + θ)(αi + ψi(1− αi + αiβ))
yˆni,t ≡ −
1 + ω−1
σ−1 + ω−1
ξˆsi,t −
σ−1 − 1
σ−1 + ω−1
ξˆdt
The parameter ω is the elasticity with respect to output of the disutility of
supplying production, and σ is the elasticity the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution.3 yˆni,t represents a change in the natural rate of output in sector
i, which is the level of supply that keeps the real marginal cost in sector i
constant at the ﬂexible price level.
The measure of inﬂation persistence is the coeﬃcient of the lagged inﬂations
in the NKPC of the sectors, i.e. κ12 and κ22. Note that when κ12 is zero, the
ﬁrst sector does not display inﬂation persistence and the model boils down
to that of BL-S.
Table 1 shows the values of the degree of persistence when the degree of nom-
3Here σ = −u′′ξdC/u′ and ω = −v′′ξsi Yi/v′ for i = 1, 2, evaluated in steady state.
Following Aoki (2001), ω is assumed to be uniform across sectors.
11
inal rigidity is the same across sectors but they diﬀer in underlying price set-
ting mechanism. As α increases, to keep nominal rigidity constant ϕ decreases
and thus the degree of persistence decreases. This implies that although each
period the probability that the optimal price is set, (1 − α)(1 − ψ), is same
across sector, the resulting degree of inﬂation persistence is not the same
across sectors for diﬀerent calibrations of (α, ψ) across sectors.
2.5 The Central Bank's Loss Function
The central bank is concerned with maximizing the welfare of the households.
Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1998, 1999) and Woodford (2003, ch.
6), the welfare measure is the expected utility of the households given by
W = E
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtUt
}
(2.19)
where
Ut = 2ut(ξ
d
t Yt/2)−
∫ 1
0
υ(ξs
1,t
y1,t(z))dz −
∫ 1
0
υ(ξs2,ty2,t(z))dz (2.20)
Following Aoki (2001), I assume that mass of one households produce for each
sector. Therefore, in equilibrium the consumption of each good is the half of
the production of that good. I assume that this steady state involves a tax
rate, which is set such that the steady state levels of output in both sectors
are eﬃcient. Thus, monetary policy is not responsible for the welfare loss
that arises from the distortion caused by monopoly power.
A second order Taylor series approximation of equation (2.20) around the
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zero inﬂation steady state is
Ut = −12u′Y¯ {λ1pˆi21,t + λ2pˆi22,t + λ3(yˆt − yˆnt ) + λ4((yˆ1,t − yˆ2,t)− κ(yˆn1,t − yˆn2,t))2}
−1
2
u′Y¯ {λ5(∆pˆi1,t)2 + λ6(∆pˆi2,t)2}
(2.21)
where
λ1 =
1
2
(θ−1 + ω−1)θ2
α1
(1− α1)(1− α1β)
λ2 =
1
2
(θ−1 + ω−1)θ2
α2
(1− α2)(1− α2β)
λ3 = σ
−1 + ω−1
λ4 =
1
4
(1 + ω−1)
λ5 =
1
2
(θ−1 + ω−1)θ2
ψ1
(1− α1)(1− ψ1)(1− α1β)
λ6 =
1
2
(θ−1 + ω−1)θ2
ψ2
(1− α2)(1− ψ2)(1− α2β)
Notice that, when ψ1 = 0, the loss function simpliﬁes to that of BL-S, where
central bank takes into account inﬂations of both sectors and change in the
inﬂation of the second sector only. The introduction of backward looking
price setters makes the deviation of the current inﬂation from inﬂation of the
previous period a concern of optimal policy, since the relative price of the
backward looking price setters are distorted as much as this deviation. Note
that, as ψ increases the weight of the deviation of this period's inﬂation from
that of the previous period, λ5 or λ6, increases. Therefore, for a constant
level of price change frequency, as the fraction of backward indexing produc-
ers increases, the weights attributed to inﬂation growth increases.
Note also that when ψ1 = ψ2 = 0 the loss function obtained is that of
Aoki (2001) and Benigno (2004). Since there exists no backward indexing
producers in the economy, deviation in inﬂation is not a concern of the central
bank. Moreover, since the only parameter governing the nominal rigidity in a
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sector is α, once it is equal across sectors, the weights of the sectoral inﬂations
is equal in the loss function. This clearly implies attaching equal weights
to sectoral inﬂations in the optimal inﬂation targeting rule. Moreover, the
equal weights can only be generated by equal frequency of price change across
sectors, which is the sole source of heterogeneity in price setting in the model.
Therefore, for purely forward looking models, the weights in the optimal
inﬂation targeting rule is 0.5 if and only if α is the same across sectors. This
implies uniform degree of nominal rigidity and inﬂation persistence across
sectors.
2.6 Optimal Inﬂation Targeting Rule
Following BL-S, the model is closed by introducing a strict inﬂation targeting
rule, which has the following form
ζpi1,t + (1− ζ)pi2,t = 0 (2.22)
where ζ is the weight that is attributed to the inﬂation of the ﬁrst sector. The
weight is chosen to maximize the welfare criterion (2.19) subject to the struc-
tural equations of the model ((2.17) and (2.18)). Once sectoral asymmetries
are introduced, under inﬂation targeting regime, the concern of the central
bank becomes which inﬂation to target. Therefore, under strict inﬂation tar-
geting rule, the central bank deﬁnes the optimal basket, which is determined
by optimally choosing the weights that should be attached to each sector.
When ζ is one, optimal inﬂation targeting policy is stabilizing the inﬂation of
the ﬁrst sector. Higher weight to one sector implies that the central bank is
targeting the inﬂation of that sector. Because, to attain zero weighted inﬂa-
tion, central bank allows the inﬂation of the sector with higher weight to vary
in a smaller band when compared to inﬂation of the other sector. To clarify,
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when ζ=0.9, 1% inﬂation in the ﬁrst sector is accompanied by 9% deﬂation in
the second sector. Central bank tries to ensure stabilization of the price level
of the ﬁrst sector by sacriﬁcing the stability of the price level of the second
sector. Note that, central bank attaches equal importance to both sectors
when ζ=0.5 and in that case optimal inﬂation targeting rule becomes CPI
targeting rule since the sectors are assumed to be of equal economic size.
In what follows, I ﬁrst compute the optimal inﬂation targeting rule when both
sectors same degree of nominal rigidity. Then, I compare the performance of
the optimal inﬂation targeting rule and the policy proposed by BL-S sug-
gesting giving equal weights to sectors in the inﬂation targeting rule, namely
targeting the CPI inﬂation.
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CHAPTER 3
OPTIMAL INFLATION TARGETING
The question that how optimal inﬂation targeting rule should be designed un-
der heterogeneity in price setting mechanism is addressed so far using models
that are obtained introducing certain restrictions to the model presented in
the previous section. As mentioned elsewhere, for models of Aoki (2001) and
Benigno (2004) it is possible to use the degree of nominal rigidity, which is
given by NR = 1/(1 − α), as a summary statistic for the optimal inﬂation
targeting policy design. They suggest that the higher the degree of nominal
rigidity in one sector, the higher the weight attached to the inﬂation of that
sector in the optimal inﬂation targeting rule. Remember that for these mod-
els, the only source of nominal rigidity is inability to change the price.
With the introduction of the backward indexing producers, two sources af-
fecting the degree of nominal rigidity arise. The ﬁrst is given by the fraction
of agents that cannot adjust their prices, αi. The second is given by the frac-
tion of agents that behave according to the rule of thumb, ψi. Therefore, for
the model with backward indexation, the degree of nominal rigidity is not as
clear as it is for purely forward-looking models.
BL-S addresses this issue by introducing backward looking price setters in one
of the regions. In order to ﬁnd a measure for the degree of nominal rigidity
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for the region with hybrid price setting, they use the strict inﬂation targeting
rule in (2.22) that attaches weights equal to the economic sizes of the regions.
In this paper, these weights are equal to each other and take the value of 0.5.
Therefore, they assume that the optimal inﬂation targeting rule is given by:
0.5pi1,t + 0.5pi2,t = 0 (3.1)
The motivation behind this is the result of Benigno (2004) that once the
regions have same degree of nominal rigidity, the weight that should be at-
tributed to their inﬂations in the optimal inﬂation targeting rule should be
equal to the economic size of the regions. Instead of calibrating the structural
parameters of the model and searching for the optimal weights in the inﬂation
targeting rule, they ﬁx the rule as (3.1) and calibrate all parameters of the
model except for fraction of backward indexing price setters, ψ, for the hybrid
price setting region. For given values of α1 and α2, they search over the values
of ψ that maximizes the welfare. That is to say, not ξ as is standard but ψ is
set optimally. Having computed the optimal fractions of backward indexing
producers that ensure that the CPI inﬂation targeting policy corresponds to
the optimal inﬂation targeting policy for diﬀerent combinations of α1 and α2,
they ﬁnd a correspondence as follows:
1
1− α1 =
1
1− α2
1
1− ψ2 (3.2)
Note that, the left hand side of (3.2) is the degree of nominal rigidity for the
purely forward looking region. They propose that the right hand side of (3.2)
is a good approximate measure for degree of nominal rigidity for the hybrid
price setting region for values of duration slightly higher than 3 or 4 quarters.
Since this paper generalizes the model of BL-S by introducing backward in-
dexing producers to both sectors, I will use the nominal rigidity measure
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proposed by BL-S as that of both sectors. Throughout the paper, this mea-
sure of nominal rigidity is assumed to be uniform across sectors.
3.1 Calibration
The discount rate β is calibrated as 0.99. I calibrate the parameter θ equal
to 6, which corresponds to a steady-state mark-up of 1.2. Following BL-S,
the elasticity of substitution in consumption, σ, is 6 and the elasticity of the
disutility of producing the diﬀerentiated goods, ω, is 0.6. The sectors are
assumed to be equal in economic size. The asymmetric supply shocks and
the symmetric demand shock follow an AR(1) process of the kind:
Xt = ρXt−1 + εt
where Xt is the vector of shock processes, Xt=(ξˆs1,t, ξˆ
s
2,t, ξˆ
d
t ), ρ is 0.9 and εt is
the vector of independently identiﬁed disturbances. The shocks ξˆs1,t, ξˆ
s
2,t and
ξˆdt have standard deviations of unity.
3.2 Optimal Inﬂation Targeting under Uniform
Degree of Nominal Rigidity across Sectors
In this section, I compute the optimal inﬂation targeting rule under the (αi,ψi)
combinations culminating in the same degree of nominal rigidity computed
by using the measure proposed by BL-S as NR = ((1− αi)(1− ψi))−1. The
optimal inﬂation targeting rule is calculated by choosing ζ in equation (3.1)
to maximize the welfare criterion (2.19) subject to the structural equations
of the model.
Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 display the weights that should be attributed
to the ﬁrst sector in the optimal inﬂation targeting rule for nominal rigidity
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of 3, 4 and 8 quarters, respectively. First row displays the frequency of price
change for the ﬁrst sector and the ﬁrst column displays that of the second
sector. The fraction of backward indexing producers, which together with
inability to change the price produces the relevant degree of nominal rigidity,
is pinned down by the equation (3.2) shown in Table 1. To illustrate, to
produce 3 quarters of nominal rigidity, a sector should have α = 0.01 and
ψ = 0.66. Note that, in order to produce same degree of nominal rigidity, for
higher values of frequency of price change, 1− α, a lower value of fraction of
backward indexing producers, ψ, should exist in the economy.
The results in Table 2 shows that the weight attributed to ﬁrst sector ranges
between 0.615, which is 23% higher than the economic size of 0.5 and 0.385,
which is 23% less than the economic size, when degree of nominal rigidity is 3
quarters. As shown in Tables 4 and 5, the optimal weight takes value within
a 15% interval of the economic size when the degree of nominal rigidity is 4
quarters and this range decreases to 13% when the degree of nominal rigid-
ity is 8 quarters. Therefore, as the degree of nominal rigidity increases, the
optimal weight converges to the economic size. This is inline with the BL-
S suggestion that this measure of nominal rigidity is a good approximation
when the degree of nominal rigidity is higher than about 4 quarters. Note
that, the optimal weight attached to the inﬂation of the ﬁrst sector takes
highest value when the two sectors are most diﬀerent than each other when
degree of nominal rigidity is 3 and 4 quarters. That is, the same degree of
nominal rigidity is generated by the highest value of α in one sector and
the lowest value of α in the other. However, when degree of nominal rigidity
is 8 quarters, this weight takes the highest value when α1 = 0.85 and α2 = 0.2.
As shown in Table 1, as inability to change the price, α,increases, to keep
nominal rigidity constant, the fraction of backward indexing producers and
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thus the degree of inﬂation persistence decreases. The inﬂation persistence
is highest when α equals 0.01 since the fraction of backward indexing pro-
ducers takes the highest value. Keeping the value of α1 constant and moving
column wise in Tables 2 to 4, α2 increases and thus the inﬂation persistence
in the second sector decreases monotonically. The weight attributed to the
inﬂation of the ﬁrst sector does not alter monotonically and takes values less
than that of the second sector for some parameter calibrations. This implies
that although ﬁrst sector displays higher inﬂation persistence than the sec-
ond sector, for some parameter calibrations, it is optimal to attribute higher
weight to the sector with lower degree of inﬂation persistence. Therefore,
another ﬁnding of this paper is that targeting the sector with higher inﬂation
persistence is not a robust policy under this generalized model.
Having shown that optimal inﬂation targeting in this generalized model at-
tributes diﬀerent weights to diﬀerent sectors even when the sectors display
same degree of nominal rigidity as measured by the suggested method of BL-
S, next subsection looks at the welfare cost of targeting the CPI inﬂation
rather than the optimal inﬂation.
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CHAPTER 4
WELFARE ANALYSIS
The previous subsection presents the optimal weights attached to sectoral
inﬂations when the nominal rigidity measure proposed by BL-S is the same
across sectors but this rigidity is created by diﬀerent combinations of price
change frequency and fraction of backward indexing producers. In this part,
the welfare comparisons of optimal inﬂation targeting policy and CPI inﬂa-
tion targeting policy will be conducted. Having calculated the fully optimal
policy, the two policies will be compared using the fully optimal policy as a
benchmark. The measure of welfare is the reduction in the deadweight loss
resulting from adopting the optimal inﬂation targeting policy instead of CPI
inﬂation targeting policy relative to welfare under fully optimal policy. This
percentage reduction in deadweight loss is computed as
DR =
E(W1)− E(W 2)
E(W 3)
× 100 (4.1)
where E(W1), E(W2), E(W3) are the welfare criteria associated respectively
with the CPI inﬂation targeting policy, the optimal inﬂation targeting policy
and the fully optimal policy. Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3 display the
reduction in deadweight loss when the uniform degree of nominal rigidity is
3, 4 and 8 quarters, respectively.
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Figures 1 to 3 show the welfare gains from adopting optimal inﬂation tar-
geting when degree of nominal rigidity is the same across sectors at 3,4 and
8 quarters, respectively, but this rigidity is produced by heterogeneous price
setting mechanism across sectors. Remember from Table 1 that, having this
kind of heterogeneity in price setting mechanism implies heterogeneity in in-
ﬂation persistence across sectors. The sector with higher α has a smaller
fraction of backward indexing producers and thus a lower degree of inﬂation
persistence. When α is higher than 0.4 for degree of nominal rigidity of 3
quarters, the implied inﬂation persistence takes values lower than 0.5. I refer
to those cases as low inﬂation persistence.
Figure 1 displays that as the frequency of price change decreases, i.e. α in-
creases, welfare gains from optimal inﬂation targeting increases. Adopting
the optimal inﬂation targeting implies about 6% welfare gain in terms of op-
timal welfare when α1 = 0.65 and α2 = 0.01, or vice versa. That is to say,
4 quarters of nominal rigidity is produced with purely backward indexing
price setting in one sector and purely forward looking pricing with a very
low probability of price change in the other sector. Therefore, although the
sectors have same degree of nominal rigidity, when one of the sectors has
high inﬂation persistence and the other has almost zero inﬂation persistence,
CPI inﬂation targeting policy is clearly suboptimal. For a constant degree of
inﬂation persistence in one sector, the lower the inﬂation persistence in one
sector and the more signiﬁcant the heterogeneity in inﬂation persistence, the
higher the welfare cost of targeting CPI inﬂation instead of optimal inﬂation.
Figure 2 displays the welfare measure when the degree of nominal rigidity is
4 quarters. When α takes values larger than 0.5 sectors displays low inﬂation
persistence. Similar to the case with 3 quarters of nominal rigidity, results
show that the lower the inﬂation persistence in one sector and the higher the
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inﬂation persistence diﬀerential across sector, the worse is the performance of
the CPI inﬂation targeting. The welfare gain from adopting optimal inﬂation
targeting takes the highest value 3% when α1 = 0.75 and α2 = 0.01. This is
the case when one of the sectors does not have inﬂation persistence at all as
the case in BL-S and the other is characterized by persistence close to unity.
Notice that, the maximum possible welfare gain for 4 quarters of nominal
rigidity is lower than that for 3 quarters of nominal rigidity.
Figure 3 displays the percentage welfare gains from adopting optimal inﬂation
targeting when the degree of nominal rigidity is 8 quarters in both sectors.
When α takes values larger than 0.65, both sectors display low inﬂation per-
sistence. In contrast to Figures 1 and 2, Figure 3 displays a nonmonotonic
relationship between the welfare measure and the frequency of price change
when α is higher than 0.65. For those values of α, the sectors are charac-
terized by low inﬂation persistence. Similar to the results of the Figures 1
and 2, the highest welfare gain is obtained when one of the sectors display
low inﬂation persistence. However, the highest gain is not obtained when the
inﬂation persistence diﬀerential is highest. The welfare gain displays a peak
at 2% when α1 = 0.85 and α2 = 0.3, or vice versa. The monotonic relation-
ship, which is observed in Figures 1 and 2, prevails when one of the sectors
is characterized by high inﬂation persistence as the persistence in the other
sector decreases, the welfare cost of adopting CPI inﬂation targeting increases.
To understand the nonmonotonicity in Figure 3 better, Figure 4 disaggregates
the welfare cost of targeting CPI inﬂation instead of optimal inﬂation into its
sources when the degree of nominal rigidity is 8 quarters. The frequency of
price change in the second sector, α2, is kept constant at 0.85. That is, sector
two is characterized by a very low degree of inﬂation persistence. The price
setting parameters of the ﬁrst sector changes in a way that always produces 8
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quarters of nominal rigidity, as before. The blue curve shows the total welfare
loss as a percent of optimal welfare. The red curve displays the welfare loss
that is resulting from variance of the output gap and the green curve displays
the contribution of the variances of all other variables of the loss function
into the welfare loss. It is easy to see that, the main determinant of the wel-
fare loss is the variation of the output gap and the nonmonotonic behavior
here is transferred to the welfare comparison criterion displayed in Figure 3.
Therefore, when the degree of nominal rigidity is 8 quarters, CPI inﬂation
targeting performs worse in stabilizing the output gap when compared to op-
timal inﬂation targeting policy and, more importantly, the variance of the
output gap itself becomes a major welfare concern. When nominal rigidity
is lower, the welfare loss stems overwhelmingly from price dispersion which
hides the nonmonotonicity stemming from the behavior of the variance of the
output gap. The fact that under high degrees of nominal rigidity welfare loss
may depend more on the behavior of the output gap than price dispersion is
underappreciated in the literature .
Note that, as the degree of nominal rigidity increases the range and the max-
imum possible value of the percentage welfare gain from adopting optimal
inﬂation targeting instead of CPI inﬂation targeting decreases. That is, the
maximum welfare loss is lower and at the same time the relationship becomes
nonmonotonic. This is because the weight in the optimal inﬂation targeting
rule converges to the economic size of 0.5 as the degree of nominal rigidity
increases and the output gap volatility becomes the major determinant of the
welfare loss.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this paper, the model of Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2006) is generalized in
order to introduce heterogeneity in inﬂation persistence across sectors. The
heterogeneity is obtained by diﬀerently calibrating the structural parameters
of the price setting mechanism across sectors.
In this paper, the degree of nominal rigidity based on the measure proposed
by BL-S is uniform across sectors but the same rigidity is produced by dif-
ferent mechanisms in diﬀerent sectors. The optimal inﬂation targeting rule
is computed and it is shown that the optimal weights attached to inﬂation of
each sector do change for diﬀerent calibrations of the structural parameters
of the price setting mechanism culminating in same degree of nominal rigidity
but heterogeneous degree of inﬂation persistence. Main concern of this paper
is the welfare cost of using the nominal rigidity measure proposed by BL-S
as a summary statistic for inﬂation targeting policy design.
The welfare cost of targeting the CPI inﬂation is calculated by using the fully
optimal policy as a benchmark. Results show that adopting optimal inﬂation
targeting instead of the CPI inﬂation targeting policy reduces the welfare
loss signiﬁcantly. The welfare gain obtained from adopting optimal inﬂation
targeting is highest when one of the sectors is characterized by a low degree
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of inﬂation persistence. Therefore, the measure of nominal rigidity proposed
by BL-S is not a suﬃcient summary statistics in terms of welfare, since the
welfare under CPI inﬂation targeting policy cannot approximate that of the
optimal inﬂation targeting policy.
In this paper, the measure proposed by BL-S is shown to be insuﬃcient for op-
timal inﬂation targeting rule design. Further line of research can be working
on estimation of a better summary statistic under heterogeneity in inﬂation
persistence across sectors. The analysis here is limited to the case that central
bank can adopt only optimal inﬂation targeting rule and robustness of CPI
inﬂation targeting is checked. The relevance of inﬂation persistence diﬀeren-
tial across sectors can be further studied for alternative simple policy rules
and welfare comparisons of these simple rules can be conducted.
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APPENDICES
A. TABLES
Table 1: Fraction of Backward Indexing Producers and Implied
Degree of Inﬂation Persistence
NR=3 NR=4 NR=8
α ψ κ2 ψ κ2 ψ κ2
0.01 0.66 0.985 0.75 0.987 0.87 0.989
0.05 0.65 0.929 0.74 0.937 0.87 0.946
0.1 0.63 0.864 0.72 0.879 0.86 0.897
0.2 0.58 0.746 0.69 0.776 0.84 0.810
0.3 0.52 0.637 0.64 0.683 0.82 0.734
0.4 0.44 0.527 0.58 0.595 0.79 0.666
0.5 0.33 0.401 0.50 0.501 0.75 0.602
0.6 0.17 0.218 0.44 0.386 0.69 0.536
0.65 0.05 0.068 0.38 0.306 0.58 0.499
0.7 0.29 0.193 0.50 0.456
0.75 0.17 0.000 0.38 0.401
0.8 0.17 0.320
0.85 0.87 0.164
The index i for sectors is suppressed. First column is the probability that price remains ﬁxed and NR is
the degree of nominal rigidity. Each value of degree of nominal rigidity is produced together with inability
to change the price,α, and fraction of backward indexing producers, ψ. To illustrate, when α equals 0.1, ψ
takes values 0.63, 0.72 and 0.86 to produce nominal rigidity of 3, 4 and 8 quarters, respectively. Column
wise as α increases, to keep NR constant, ψ decreases. κ2 is the coeﬃcient of lagged inﬂation in the NKPC,
the measure for the degree of inﬂation persistence, is given by κ2 = ψ/α+ ψ(1− α+ αβ). Note that as
ψ increases, κ2 increases. When κ2 takes value higher than 0.5, the sector is considered to display high
inﬂation persistence and otherwise the sector is considered to display low inﬂation persistence.
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Table 2: Optimal Weights to First Sector under Inﬂation Targeting
(ξ),(NR=3)
α1
α2
0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.65
0.01 0.500 0.501 0.502 0.505 0.503 0.487 0.442 0.401 0.385
0.05 0.499 0.500 0.501 0.504 0.503 0.490 0.451 0.412 0.395
0.1 0.498 0.499 0.500 0.503 0.503 0.493 0.462 0.426 0.408
0.2 0.495 0.496 0.497 0.500 0.502 0.497 0.481 0.454 0.435
0.3 0.497 0.497 0.497 0.498 0.500 0.500 0.494 0.479 0.462
0.4 0.513 0.510 0.507 0.503 0.500 0.500 0.501 0.497 0.486
0.5 0.558 0.549 0.538 0.519 0.506 0.499 0.500 0.504 0.502
0.6 0.599 0.588 0.574 0.546 0.521 0.503 0.496 0.500 0.504
0.65 0.615 0.605 0.592 0.565 0.538 0.514 0.498 0.496 0.500
First row displays the probability that producers in the ﬁrst sector cannot change their prices and ﬁrst
column is that of the second sector. The fraction of backward indexing producer is changed to obtain
nominal rigidity of 3 quarters.
Table 3: Optimal Weights to First Sector under Inﬂation Targeting
(ξ),(NR=4)
α1
α2
0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.75
0.01 0.500 0.500 0.501 0.503 0.505 0.501 0.479 0.443 0.430 0.421
0.05 0.500 0.500 0.501 0.503 0.505 0.502 0.483 0.451 0.437 0.428
0.1 0.499 0.499 0.500 0.502 0.505 0.503 0.488 0.461 0.447 0.436
0.2 0.497 0.497 0.498 0.500 0.503 0.504 0.496 0.479 0.465 0.450
0.3 0.495 0.495 0.495 0.497 0.500 0.502 0.501 0.494 0.482 0.465
0.4 0.499 0.498 0.497 0.496 0.498 0.500 0.502 0.504 0.498 0.480
0.5 0.521 0.517 0.512 0.504 0.499 0.498 0.500 0.507 0.510 0.495
0.6 0.557 0.549 0.539 0.521 0.506 0.496 0.493 0.500 0.512 0.508
0.7 0.570 0.563 0.553 0.535 0.518 0.502 0.490 0.488 0.500 0.507
0.75 0.579 0.572 0.564 0.550 0.535 0.520 0.505 0.492 0.493 0.500
First row displays the probability that producers in the ﬁrst sector cannot change their prices and ﬁrst
column is that of the second sector. The fraction of backward indexing producer is changed to obtain
nominal rigidity of 4 quarters.
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Table 4: Optimal Weights to First Sector under Inﬂation Targeting
(ξ),(NR=8)
α1
α2
0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.85
0.01 0.500 0.499 0.499 0.499 0.501 0.504 0.508 0.508 0.506 0.539 0.559
0.05 0.501 0.500 0.499 0.499 0.501 0.505 0.510 0.510 0.509 0.541 0.561
0.1 0.501 0.501 0.500 0.500 0.502 0.506 0.511 0.512 0.513 0.544 0.563
0.2 0.501 0.501 0.500 0.500 0.502 0.507 0.512 0.516 0.520 0.549 0.565
0.3 0.499 0.499 0.498 0.498 0.500 0.505 0.511 0.517 0.525 0.552 0.564
0.4 0.496 0.495 0.494 0.493 0.495 0.500 0.507 0.516 0.527 0.553 0.561
0.5 0.492 0.490 0.489 0.488 0.489 0.493 0.500 0.510 0.526 0.550 0.555
0.6 0.492 0.490 0.488 0.484 0.483 0.484 0.490 0.500 0.518 0.543 0.545
0.7 0.494 0.491 0.487 0.480 0.475 0.473 0.474 0.482 0.500 0.528 0.533
0.8 0.461 0.459 0.456 0.451 0.448 0.447 0.450 0.457 0.472 0.500 0.514
0.85 0.441 0.439 0.437 0.435 0.436 0.439 0.445 0.455 0.467 0.486 0.500
First row displays the probability that producers in the ﬁrst sector cannot change their prices and ﬁrst
column is that of the second sector. The fraction of backward indexing producer is changed to obtain
nominal rigidity of 3 quarters.
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B. FIGURES
Figure 1
Welfare gain from adopting optimal inﬂation targeting instead of CPI inﬂation
targeting as a percentage of the welfare under fully optimal policy when degree
of nominal rigidity is 3 quarters.
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Figure 2
Welfare gain from adopting optimal inﬂation targeting instead of CPI inﬂa-
tion targeting as a percentage of the welfare under fully optimal policy when
degree of nominal rigidity is 4 quarters.
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Figure 3
Welfare gain from adopting optimal inﬂation targeting instead of CPI inﬂa-
tion targeting as a percentage of the welfare under fully optimal policy when
degree of nominal rigidity is 8 quarters.
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Figure 4
Welfare comparison criterion (4.1) is decomposed into its determinants and
the dominant one is the variance of the output gap. The frequency of price
change in the second sector is 0.85.
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